The retreat and the mismanagement at Montreal part 4 (Quebec 1775)

The threat from the east

Forster had achieved only local success, largely because Carleton had not moved from Quebec. With the Americans gone, Carleton had turned his attention to internal security, forbidding those who had collaborated from entering Quebec without written permits. A commission toured the country around Trois Rivieres, mobilizing the militia, identifying those areas that had been least loyal, and focusing on the desire of most habitants to remain neutral. At the same time, Carleton went out of his way to behave humanely to his prisoners. The militia was ordered to search for stragglers, sick, and non-walking wounded who might either starve to death or suffer abuse from enraged habitants. Morgan and the other officers captured at Quebec were paroled, each receiving gold and a new shirt as he left for home.

Others, such as MacLean, believed that softness and delay would allow the enemy to recover. Apart from the recapture of the Gaspé by the Royal Navy, and the arrival of the 29th and 47th Foot at Trois Rivieres, there was no offensive movement. Even when Carleton learned of Forster's victory at The Cedars, rather than head west, he returned to Quebec to greet Burgoyne, who had arrived on 1 June. However, Carleton's absence did leave MacLean in command at Trois Rivieres and the active Scot landed the troops and set up camp to await his superior's return.

Meanwhile, at Sorel, MajGen John Thomas had regrouped and met with the commissioners. However, on 21 May, he contracted smallpox and died on 2 June. The previous day, MajGen John Sullivan had arrived with over 5,000 reinforcements and now found himself in command. The commissioners, believing rumors that Carleton's reinforcements were just two regiments from Halifax, urged him to order the army back to Deschambault. Apart from a few zealots, such as Duggan, and the Canadians, the order was not well received until a report came in that MacLean, at Trois Rivieres, had only 300 men.8

On the afternoon of 6 June Sullivan sent Brigadier General William Thompson with 2,000 men, to investigate Trois Rivieres and attack MacLean if circumstances appeared favorable. The troops left Sorel by boat and landed opposite Nicolet. They crossed the river the following night and landed at Pointe du Lac, about seven miles (11km) west of Trois Rivieres, at 2.00am. Leaving 250 men to guard the boats, Thompson divided his troops into four regimental columns and a small reserve, and set out through the woods keeping out of sight of the river. Unfortunately, his guide, a local farmer, lost his way (deliberately or accidentally) and led the Americans into a swamp. Struggling out of the woods, Thompson's column found the Martin and several other vessels with their guns trained on the road and quickly fell back under a hail of grapeshot.

Meanwhile, the other columns had made better progress. Wayne's column emerged first, and drove back some light infantry and Indians. In the distance across a meadow he saw the church and monastery, but also Fraser's brigade maneuvering into line. As the other columns emerged there were increasingly heavy exchanges of musketry, until Fraser brought up two 6-pdrs rapidly unloaded from one of the transports. He swept the woods with canister at which the entire American brigade broke, pursued by the flank companies of the 9th, 20th, and 62nd Foot. Thompson tried to rally as many men as he could, but only 50 stood with him and he was quickly overrun.

With Thompson and Irvine captured and St Clair wounded, command fell on Wayne. Although it was his first time under fire, Wayne kept his head. He formed a rearguard of 800 men from various units and planned a charge into the town. The British anticipated the move and some Regulars marched out to meet him, until halted by the fire of

Irvine's riflemen. Wayne's men then came under fire from artillery in the defenses around the town and the vessels in the St Lawrence. Realizing that the planned assault was not feasible, he fell back into the woods and ordered one company after another to slip away, finally leaving 20 riflemen to cover the withdrawal.

The retreat and the mismanagement at Montreal part 3 (Quebec 1775)

Meanwhile, Sherburn had sent a man ahead to learn what was happening at the fort. The man returned with news that Forster was marching to attack Sherburn with over 500 men. Not knowing that this was an exaggeration, Sherburn re-embarked his men, but found out the next day that Butterfield was still holding out, and set off again for The Cedars.

Again, however, his approach was discovered and about four miles (6km) from The Cedars he was attacked by Lorimier's men. Believing himself outnumbered, Sherburn surrendered with 97 of his men. Casualties had been light on both sides, but unfortunately the one death on the British side was a Seneca war chief, whose demise caused the tribesmen to threaten their prisoners.7

Having captured Butterfield's and Sherburn's commands (487 men in all) Forster placed the officers in the custody of some priests and set out for Montreal Island with 500 men and the rest of the prisoners. On 24 May, he arrived at Pointe Claire, 18 miles (29km) from Montreal, and learned that Arnold was entrenched around a large stone house at Lachine, with 600 men and some artillery. In fact, Arnold was also expecting the 1st Pennsylvania Battalion and some other detachments, which would eventually give him 1,500 men. Whilst his force grew, Forster's shrank as the independent-minded tribesmen returned home with their plunder. With no further news from Carleton, Forster decided to pull back to The Cedars, but was embarrassed by the numbers of prisoners and decided to effect an exchange. He found Sherburn and Butterfield so eager to remove their men from the clutches of the Indians that not only did they agree to leave four captains as hostages and that no prisoner would serve again during the war, but also that no similar condition would apply to the British prisoners.

As Forster pulled back, Arnold moved up to the eastern end of Montreal Island and on 26 May arrived at Vaudreuil by bateaux. Seeing Forster's men drawn up for battle, Arnold kept out of range of the two cannon Forster had captured at The Cedars. Landing on the opposite bank, Arnold formulated a plan to cross the river at night and attack Forster's flank and rear at dawn. However, his officers - especially Hazen - felt that the Indians would prevent any surprise and that a night march would end in confusion. The acrimonious discussions ended just after midnight and at 2.00am Sherburn arrived under a flag of truce and outlined the response to Arnold's threat to kill any Indian he caught serving with Forster and burn their villages. Arnold knew that any prisoner in their hands would be tortured and killed and agreed to the terms negotiated with Forster (except for the condition on not serving again during the war). It is worth noting that there was no mention of any ill-treatment of the men held by Forster.

The transfer occurred between 27 and 30 May, after which Forster retired to Oswegatchie and de Haas (who had taken over from Arnold) withdrew to Lachine. De Haas ignored an order from Arnold to burn the village of Conosadaga, believing that it would serve no purpose and might unleash forces that he had insufficient force to confront, let alone control. As the prisoners returned south, Congress condemned the actions of Butterfield and Arnold. Using the alleged atrocities as an excuse, they repudiated the agreement, despite written confirmation by one of the four hostages that the allegations of brutality were untrue.

The retreat and the mismanagement at Montreal part 2 (Quebec 1775)

The threat from the west

The Americans had deliberately ignored the British posts on the Great Lakes. They did not have the manpower to capture them, but if Quebec fell, those posts would have to surrender anyway. However, in April Arnold sent Captain Timothy Bedel with 400 men and two guns to fortify a trading post at The Cedars, 40 miles (65km) west of Montreal, to prevent trade and guard against a surprise attack.

Captain George Forster, commander of the light company of the 8th Foot based at Oswegatchie, had maintained clandestine links with Montreal and knew of Bedel's mission. The winter had seen the usual Indian migration to his post for handouts, but the warriors had remained longer than usual anticipating action. With 40 Regulars, a dozen British and Canadian volunteers, and 200 warriors under Lorimier, Forster decided to attack Montreal. Leaving on 12 May, he halted at the western shore of Lake Francis, where he learned of Bedel's strength, which demoralized the Indians until a letter arrived from Carleton stating that reinforcements were arriving at Quebec. On 18 May, Forster crossed the lake, headed for The Cedars, and surrounded the stockade.

When Bedel learned of Forster's approach he promptly fell ill, turned over command to Major Isaac Butterfield and fled to Montreal. Lacking artillery, Forster's troops resorted to long-range sniping with the Americans replying in kind. Whilst the firing produced no casualties, the whoops of the warriors created panic inside the stockade. Butterfield was extremely receptive to a summons to surrender, negotiations stalling only when Butterfield insisted that his men retain their arms. As more Canadians arrived to reinforce Forster, Lorimier proposed a simultaneous assault from two sides.

Meanwhile, Arnold had sent Major Henry Sherburn and a further 150 men to reinforce Butterfield and began raising more troops with the intention of following. Sherburn disembarked about nine miles (14km) downstream from The Cedars on the day Forster landed. News of his approach caused Forster to postpone the attack and send some men to watch Sherburn. At this point, Butterfield - unaware that relief was near - offered to surrender if Forster protected his command from the Indians. Forster agreed and the Americans marched out to allow the warriors to plunder the fort. When they had finished, Butterfield and his men returned to their barracks.

The retreat and the mismanagement at Montreal part 1 (Quebec 1775)

Despite events at Quebec, the beginning of 1776 saw Congress still sanguine that French Canadians would not only welcome "liberation" but would actively support it. While the recruiting parties for Lhdngston's and Hazen's new regiments had barely scraped together 500 recruits, the habitants were still providing supplies (at a price) and refusing to help Carleton. As long as the Americans behaved reasonably, the worst that could happen was that the people stayed passive.

As an Irishman, Montgomery, like Carleton, was aware of Catholic sensitivities, and had noted the habitants' disregard for the clergy when it suited them. Ignoring the latter, he had concentrated on winning the support of the former. Unfortunately, David Wooster had not, and the return of the vengeful Thomas Walker saw American policy depart rapidly from the "brotherly affection" and respect for personal property promised in the letter from Washington that Wooster had distributed on his arrival.

Despite advice to leave the Catholic Church well alone, Wooster insisted on closing the "Mass houses" on Christmas Eve. On the news of Montgomery's death, he took 12 hostages from among known loyalists. He later released them, but leaked a list of 64 "suspects" whom he was prepared to have deported to Philadelphia. He later disarmed the pro-British community, taking two new hostages, and set about reconstructing the militia. All officers would surrender the King's commission, new companies would be formed and new officers elected by the rank-and-file, and all ranks would swear allegiance to Congress. When several officers protested that their Royal commissions were precisely the type of personal property that the Americans had promised to respect, they were imprisoned in Fort Chambly.

Relations were further strained by lack of money. Once their gold was exhausted, the Americans resorted to paper money. This the Canadians shunned due to their experiences in the previous war. The Americans eventually turned to outright confiscation of property and forced labor, though often this was a last resort to alleviate shortages likely to cause the troops to mutiny. When Wooster departed for Quebec, his legacy included new taxes (for which, ironically, no Canadian had voted), bankruptcy, and civil unrest. Hazen, who replaced Wooster until Arnold arrived on 19 April, warned Schuyler that the Canadians were no longer friendly, and could rise up at any moment.

In February, Congress had appointed a three-man commission -Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll (the latter two from Maryland, the only colony where Catholicism flourished) - to tour Canada to counter the hostility of the Catholic Church and rebuild trust. To assist them Congress also sent a priest, Father John Carroll, and a French printer from Philadelphia, Fleury Mesplet. On 2 April the commissioners left Philadelphia and reached Montreal on 29 April, to be greeted by carefully selected "representatives" of the citizenry.

Unfortunately, they had arrived too late and, more importandy, had brought no money to alleviate the army's $14,000 debt (which excluded the $20,000 loaned by James Price). Father Carroll found the local clergy convinced that the Quebec Act had given them all they wanted, and agreed that Carleton's liberal policies had inspired loyalty. Mesplet established his press in the Chateau de Ramezay, but had not published anything when events brought the mission to a premature end. Franklin's health had deteriorated during the long journey and, despite releasing the political prisoners, he could not redress Wooster's blunders. On 11 May, Franklin and Father Carroll left for Philadelphia.

On 5 May, Samuel Chase and Charles Carroll attended a council of war at Sorel, where all parties agreed that the populous, fertile triangle between Montreal, Chambly, and Sorel must be defended. British reinforcements might soon end the siege of Quebec, but that was no reason to give up the rest of Canada. The commissioners visited Chambly and St Johns and then returned to Montreal to write a report on the state of the defenses, before leaving for Philadelphia. The report blamed the short-term enlistments and Wooster's interference for the debacle and demanded his recall. More importantly, Wooster's decision to stop the merchants of Montreal trading with the Indians, in order to restrict the flow of intelligence, was overturned by the commissioners.

The retreat and the crisis at Quebec part 2 (Quebec 1775)

The lack of trained artillerymen meant that Arnold could never match the weight and number (148) of Carleton's guns, but even so the governor took no chances. When a foraging party found recently manufactured scaling ladders outside the St Louis Bastion, he ordered the snow drifts cleared from the ditch, barricaded the Lower Town with blocks of ice from the river, built two blockhouses outside the walls, and cut a trench in the river ice under Cape Diamond to prevent the picket barriers being outflanked. At night, fireballs lit the darker recesses of the ditch. But the attack never came.

Although no attack came from the outside, the prisoners inside the city were active. The officers in the upper floor of the Seminary, and the enlisted men housed in the Recollet Monastery, and later the Dauphine Bastion, prepared to escape, but both attempts were thwarted. However, some did find a way out. The Royal Highland Emigrants had recruited 94 men from among the British-born prisoners, who were guilty of treason and therefore liable to hang. Within days, 14 of them had gone over the wall (literally) and Carleton had the rest disarmed. Otherwise, American activity was reduced to indiscriminate shelling of the Upper and Lower Towns - an act condemned by many of the captured officers watching the bombardment from the windows of the Seminary.

On 1 May, Major General John Thomas of Massachusetts replaced Wooster, bringing with him over 1,200 men. On the night of 3 May, with the river now open, a brig was spotted moving upriver. However, when it failed to answer the identification signals Carleton had agreed with Pringle before his departure, the guns in the Lower Town pounded the vessel. Men were seen fleeing in a small boat: the brig was a fireship designed to destroy the shipping at Queen's Wharf. It was also the swansong of the American forces besieging Quebec.

Concerned at the state of the army, Thomas had proposed to withdraw to Jacques Carrier and Deschambault and fortify those places. Unfortunately, the following day saw the arrival of the first British ships - the frigate Surprise closely followed by the ship Isis and the sloop Martin. From them disembarked 200 men of the 29th Foot and Marines. Learning that Thomas was pulling back, Carleton immediately ordered a sortie. Adding the 7th Foot, Royal Highland Emigrants, and city militia to the fresh troops, he attacked Thomas's encampment with 900 men and turned the latter's orderly withdrawal into a panic-stricken retreat.

By 7 May the exhausted Americans - many with smallpox - had halted in Deschambault, where they were shelled by British vessels on the St Lawrence. Thomas wanted to make a stand but his army did not. The men were tired and sick and the position could easily be taken in the rear by Carleton, who had complete command of the river. Thomas ordered his troops back to Sorel, leaving 500 men to garrison Deschambault, but even these were withdrawn several days later.

The retreat and the crisis at Quebec part 1 (Quebec 1775)

The winter of 1775 was one of the worst in living memory. Outnumbered almost three to one, the best Arnold could do now was to deny the enemy firewood and forage, so he systematically burned outlying buildings and even some of the ships moored in the river. Carleton remained inside the city and refused to discuss prisoner exchanges, which Arnold sought to regain his only experienced artillery officer, Lamb.

From late January, American reinforcements began arriving from Ticonderoga via Montreal, including Warner's Green Mountain Boys and the first units from New Jersey and Pennsylvania. However, the journey had left the men in poor health, their uniforms in tatters and their weapons unserviceable. They arrived to find the camp riddled with smallpox (allegedly started by a prostitute sent out by Carleton), so much so that the other sick and the wounded were denied attention. Dr Senter reported 400 smallpox cases, mostly among the New Englanders; apparently, half of Warner's and Brown's men had disobeyed orders and inoculated themselves.

Equally worrying was the lack of specie. On 4 March, Arnold proclaimed that whoever accepted paper money would be paid in full, in coin, within four months. The ruse kept the army supplied for a few more months, but stories of troops looting from civilians - even priests and nuns - at bayonet point became rife. Discipline was collapsing and men overheard talking of going home when their enlistments expired were flogged. Even among officers morale was low, a situation not helped by the campaign still being waged against Arnold by Brown, Easton, and others.

The effect was to cause the habitants to reconsider their loyalties. On 23 March, 300 assembled to attack a detachment of Arnold's troops at Point Levis. Arnold learned of this and sent Major Lewis Dubois with 150 New Yorkers to the south shore, where they were joined by 150 rebel Canadians. Dubois dispersed the 46-strong advance party, killing three and wounding several more. Soon after, Carleton's sentries noticed men erecting a battery at Point Levis. Despite constant shelling, the battery became operational on 2 April, throwing red-hot shot at the town and the shipping in the river. Later that day, three men, believed to be Wooster, Arnold, and Antill, were seen surveying the town from a distance of 500 yards (457m). The next day, a second battery sprouted in front of Porte St Louis; a third later appeared across the St Charles.

Arnold and the siege of the city part 6 (Quebec 1775)

Back at Camp, Arnold wrote to David Wooster confirming the defeat and Montgomery's death and begging Wooster to relieve him. At one point, fearing a sortie by the garrison, he issued muskets to the patients in the hospital. Of his own command, at least 30 were dead (20 more bodies were found after the spring thaw and several reportedly fell through the ice while fleeing across the frozen rivers) and 42 wounded, the latter being among the 426 prisoners now under guard in Quebec. Another dozen had been slain alongside Montgomery. Carleton had lost six dead (Anderson and five militia privates) and one militiaman wounded.

Montgomery's body was found the next day and given a quiet but decent burial on 5 January, along with Macpherson and Cheeseman. Two days after the attack, Meigs was allowed out on parole to collect the personal belongings of those captured and bring them into the city. With 100 men leaving as their enlistments expired, Arnold now had barely 600 fit men. Wooster would not leave Montreal, however, as, with only 600 men himself, he feared the defeat would inspire an uprising. He sent Antill and Hazen to Albany to tell Schuyler, who, though shocked, could send no reinforcements as the enlistments of his own men were about to expire, and he needed the rest to oppose Johnson, who was rallying Indians and Loyalists in the Mohawk Valley. General Washington was equally powerless to help, as the refusal of Congress to authorize long-term enlistments (or even to offer bounties for re-enlistment) had left his own army short of men. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut were asked to raise one regiment each specifically for service in Canada. However, even these colonies were struggling to find recruits; those that could, refused to allow their men to serve in "mixed" units. At this point, Washington considered resigning.

Arnold and the siege of the city part 5 (Quebec 1775)

Morgan then raced up Sault au Matelot to the next barricade. Finding the gate open and unguarded, he surveyed the work and returned. However, his officers refused to push on until the main body came up, fearing that their growing haul of prisoners (three times their own number) would overpower any guards. It was another 30 minutes before the main body caught up and the delay would prove fatal. Still further back, Dearborn's company, delayed by a high tide, was only just entering St Roche.

Meanwhile, Caldwell, with a detachment of British Militia, was investigating the activity at Cape Diamond. Spotting Brown's action as a feint, he was returning to report to Carleton when he learned of Arnold's attack on Sault au Matelot. Picking up 30 Royal Highland Emigrants under Captain John Nairne of MacLean's regiment and 50 sailors led by a former naval officer named Anderson, he headed for the second barricade. There he found 200 French Militia under Voyer and Captain Alexandre Dumas, and a company of the 7th Foot, all in a state of confusion not knowing how to defend the barricade. Dispersing the militia and Emigrants into the surrounding houses, he formed the Regulars in a double line behind the 12ft (3.6m) high barricade, with cannon mounted on a platform immediately behind them pointing down the Sault au Matelot.

Reinforced by the Pennsylvanian riflemen, and Greene's and Meigs' detachments, Morgan led his men toward the second barricade. Some sailors, led by Anderson, sallied through the gate and blocked his path. Anderson called on Morgan to surrender, at which Morgan shot him dead and the sailors retreated through the gate. Shouting "Quebec is ours!" Morgan's men surged forward, but were caught in a hail of musketry from the upper windows of the houses. With men falling on every side, the Americans placed their ladders against the barricade but were beaten back. Some riflemen tried to outflank the barricade through a house, but were cleared out at bayonet point by Nairne. At this point the Americans could still have escaped, but as Steele, Topham, Hendrick, and Lamb all fell wounded, Morgan ordered his men into the houses. Once inside, they refused to venture out into the hail of lead.

Informed of events in Sault au Matelot, Carleton ordered Captain George Laws to retake the first barricade with 500 Emigrants and sailors. Laws emerged from the Porte Palais only to encounter Dearborn still blundering around St Roche. With their powder damp, Dearborn's men could not fight back and his entire group was captured and taken into the Upper Town. Laws then continued toward the first barricade, but found himself entirely alone amongst Morgan's men. He tried to bluff them into surrendering but was taken prisoner. However, once his men re-occupied the barricade the Americans' fate was sealed. After holding out until 10.00am, one group after another gave up as they ran out of ammunition. Finally, only Morgan was left. Refusing to surrender to a British officer, he handed his sword to a priest.

Carleton ordered a small force to deal with Wool's battery in St Roche. Wool was reinforced by men of the 3rd New York and Livingston's Canadians, but the British managed to capture the guns and withdraw successfully. Beyond that, however, Carleton would not risk his men outside the city walls - a decision that was not unanimously supported. Caldwell, in particular, suggested that more aggression would have finished the Americans off. Nonetheless, the moment of crisis had passed.

Arnold and the siege of the city part 4 (Quebec 1775)

As Brown released the signal rockets to start the operation, Montgomery led his column down to Wolfe's Cove, where they headed east, negotiating large blocks of ice and climbing the rocky precipice on the landward side wherever the river bank was blocked. As they neared Prés de Ville they heard the bell of Notre Dame des Victoires over the wind rousing the city. Sentries had spotted lanterns bobbing about in the swirling snow and the citizens were arming themselves.

Below the tip of Cape Diamond the column was stopped by a line of picket posts running from the river's edge to the cliff. Four were cut down and Montgomery stepped through the gap and walked to the next barrier. Taking a saw, he cut through two posts beside the cliff (to avoid enemy lines of fire) and slipped through, accompanied by a dozen officers and men. After a brief conference with his aides, Montgomery unsheathed his sword, held it aloft and led the advance across the open space between the barricade and a two-story blockhouse. The building held four small cannon manned by nine sailors and some 30 French and nine British militiamen. When the advancing Americans were about 50yds (45m) away they opened fire. Montgomery was hit in the head and killed instantly. So too were his aides, Captains Jacob Cheesemen and John Macpherson, a sergeant, and most of the men with him.

Montgomery's deputy quartermaster, Colonel Donald Campbell, was now the senior officer. Moving forward he found about 50 men at the second barricade, their muskets useless in the snowstorm. The surviving officers recommended withdrawal and Campbell agreed, taking command of the rearguard as the column fell back along the riverbank. Inside the blockhouse the occupants apparently panicked, having no idea what was happening outside. Later when news of Arnold's attack arrived, a Boston loyalist, John Coffin, used his bayonet to stop the men abandoning the post.

On the other side of the city, Arnold's column was led by 30 riflemen and Lamb's gunners with a brass 6-pdr on a sled. Behind them were the remaining riflemen, under Morgan, Steele, and Hendricks. Then came Greene's and Meigs' contingents, and finally the Indians and Canadians. A message had been sent to Dearborn on the north bank of the St Charles, but he had not shown up. Arnold could only hope he would join en route.

As the rockets went off, they moved through St Roche. Opposite the Porte Palais the main body was spotted by sentries and the whole column was struck by musketry and grenades from the ramparts. Lamb's 6-pdr was abandoned after becoming stuck in a snowdrift and the gunners became infantrymen. As the column passed through the docks it reached the first barrier across Sault au Matelot, defended by 30 militia and three cannon. Without Lamb's gun, Arnold had no option but to launch a frontal assault.

As the column surged forward, Arnold was struck in the left ankle by a ricocheting bullet. A rifleman and Chaplain Spring carried him back to Dr Senter. Almost instinctively the men turned to Morgan, who responded by leading them forward and being the first to scale a ladder. Musket fire scorched his face, knocking him off the ladder, but he climbed back up again with two riflemen, jumped onto the gun platform and rolled under one of the cannon to avoid the bayonets of the defenders. His men followed up the ladder and within minutes had captured the 30 defenders for the loss of one dead and six wounded.

Arnold and the siege of the city part 3 (Quebec 1775)

Montgomery ordered a new battery constructed closer to the walls and Lamb selected a site some 700yds (640m) from the Porte St Jean, behind some houses. With the earth frozen digging was out of the question, so the gunners filled their gabions with snow and doused them with water to create walls of ice. The battery was finished in three nights and was soon the target of British fire, but the results were not visible as the houses were in the way. Carleton ordered them demolished, but his gunners set them ablaze instead and a strong wind almost carried the fire into the city. A few days later, he refused demands from his officers to burn St Foy and St Roche.

However, with the houses gone, Lamb's battery was exposed and quickly destroyed - two guns were knocked out, three men killed and several others wounded. On the night of 17 December, the guns were removed, and the following day Montgomery made one last effort to coax Carleton into surrendering. Arnold delivered a letter promising Carleton and Cramahe safe passage to England, but was kept waiting outside the gates until one of Carleton's aides announced from the walls that the governor would neither read the letter nor treat with rebels.

Montgomery was now being urged to storm the city without further delay (although rumors that he already had were sweeping England and North America). His Canadians wanted action and the enlistments of many American soldiers would expire on 31 December. He wrote to David Wooster and George Washington, oudining the difficulties and promising to attack at the first heavy snowstorm, relying on the garrison being spread thinly around the city whilst concentrating his own forces. On Christmas Day, he told the army of his plan. Most of the troops supported it and he received a rousing cheer, heard on the ramparts, but a significant number admitted to being apprehensive or downright skeptical. On 27 December, a snowstorm blew up, lasting all day and into the night. The troops made ready - the New Yorkers and four musket companies from Arnold's contingent would attack the Cape Diamond Bastion, whilst Greene would lead the rest into the Lower Town. However, just after midnight the wind died, the sky cleared, and the attack was cancelled - fortuitously as it turned out, as a prisoner and a deserter had escaped and warned Carleton. Montgomery changed his plan, but now had another problem to deal with - smallpox. A second hospital was established three miles (5km) away, but it was soon overflowing and, despite orders to the contrary, many men inoculated themselves.

On the afternoon of 30 December, another storm blew up. By nightfall it had become the heavy "northeaster" Montgomery desired and around 4.00am he ordered the troops to form up. He would lead 300 New Yorkers past Cape Diamond and into the Lower Town from the south. Arnold, with 600 men including 50 gunners, would leave St Roche and attack from the north through the Sault au Matelot. At the same time Livingston would feint against the Porte St Jean with his Canadians, and Brown would engage the Cape Diamond bastion with 100 men. Montgomery and Arnold would join forces and head into the Upper Town, hoping the merchants would panic and force Carleton to surrender. In fact, Carleton had issued orders to burn the wharves and warehouses in such an event.

Arnold and the siege of the city part 2 (Quebec 1775)

Arnold then wrote to Cramahe, offering to spare private property if he surrendered. It took two attempts to deliver the letter, the officer chosen being forced to take cover from cannon fire despite being under a flag of truce. On 16 November, Cramahe called a council of war, at which MacLean announced that the garrison now numbered 1,178, that the 5,000 civilians already had enough food to last until spring, and that food and firewood were still coming in through the American lines. Not surprisingly, the vote was unanimous in favor of holding out.

Two days later, Arnold learned that MacLean was planning a sortie. An inventory of his own military supplies revealed that over 100 muskets had been irreparably damaged and that his musket men had less than five rounds each. Even Morgan, with whom Arnold had quarreled the previous day over rations, agreed that the only option was to retreat 20 miles (32km) to Pointe aux Trembles and await the arrival of Montgomery. By dawn the next day, the troops pulled back through the villages along the north bank of the river and Hanchet abandoned Point Levis.

At Pointe aux Trembles the men enjoyed home comforts while Arnold ordered shirts, stockings, caps and mittens, ammunition, rum, and money from Montreal. Whilst awaiting Montgomery, Arnold experienced the first signs of discontent with his style of leadership. When Arnold ordered Hanchet to transport cannon to Sillery by bateaux he refused. Later in the siege, several captains would ask Montgomery to transfer them from Arnold's command.

On 2 December, a schooner and two smaller vessels, both loaded with Montgomery's troops, arrived at Point aux Trembles. The combined force returned to Quebec, Montgomery setting up his headquarters in St Foy. With his New Yorkers occupying the Plains of Abraham, he sent Arnold's musket men to St Roche and the riflemen to the meadows along the St Charles River. He then had a message to the merchants shot into the city with arrows and used a local woman to deliver an ultimatum to Carleton. Carleton read the document, ordered a servant to put it in the fire and had the old woman put in jail and later drummed out of the city.

Carleton now assigned his Regulars, Marines, and Emigrants to MacLean, and the sailors to Captain John Hamilton of the Royal Navy. Colonel Henry Caldwell took command of the British militia and Noël Voyer the French, while the engineer, James Thompson, had blockhouses, gun platforms and barricades built to cover the main streets of the Lower Town. Meanwhile, Montgomery began the bombardment of the city from a battery of five mortars in St Roche, but two days of shelling produced few casualties and merely improved the confidence of the civilian population. Much more damaging were the efforts of the riflemen, who began picking off defenders on the ramparts. However, the dangers were not one-sided - cannon on the walls made it dangerous for the Americans to show themselves. One shell destroyed Montgomery's sleigh, killing his horse, while he was conferring with his officers.

Arnold and the siege of the city part 1 (Quebec 1775)

Unaware of Arnold's proximity, Cramahe was trying to keep control of the city. Militia patrolled the streets, the gates were shut at 6.00pm, and non-residents had to report to the guard commander. Like Carleton, he had no illusions about many habitants joining the garrison, though one British officer believed that this was more from opposition to the Quebec Act than support for the Americans. Nevertheless, known sympathizers such as McCord, Antill, Macaulay, and Mercier were all under surveillance, and many other merchants openly discussed surrender.

Reports of armed men at Point Levis forced Cramahe to act. He warned off Macaulay, had Mercier confined on one of the warships, and arranged for all canoes and boats to be removed from the south bank of the river and Ile d'Orleans. On 3 November, the frigate Lizard arrived with money, militia uniforms, and 100 volunteers from Newfoundland. This raised spirits briefly, but five days later a landing party from the sloop Hunter was fired on by riflemen. On 12 November, MacLean returned from Sorel, having completed the journey by road after gales had forced him ashore. At last Cramahe, a lifelong civilian who was widely criticized but who had done much of value, had an officer he could entrust with the defense of the city. The garrison now comprised 1,126 men. More importantly they were led by officers such as captains John Nairne, Malcolm Frazer, and George Laws of MacLean's own regiment, militia colonels Henry Caldwell and Noël Voyer, and Captain John Hamilton of the Royal Navy - men who could be depended on in a crisis.

By 13 November, Arnold had acquired 40 canoes and at 9.00pm the first wave set off. Passing between Lizard and Hunter and eluding the patrolling guard boats, they landed a mile (1.6km) above Wolfe's Cove. As the canoes returned for a second trip, the first group occupied a house and lit a fire. They were spotted immediately and shots were exchanged. Despite the loss of surprise, by 4.00am three waves with over 500 men had crossed safely. The remainder followed over the next few days, leaving Hanchet and 50 men to guard Point Levis. Arnold followed Wolfe's path onto the Plains of Abraham and called a council of war to discuss whether to storm the city that night. Morgan was in favor but, with over 100 men and most of the scaling ladders still on the south bank, he was outvoted.

Morgan then occupied the suburb of St Foy, seizing large quantities of cattle and potatoes and looting houses. While the men were eating, one of Morgan's sentries was captured by a British patrol. This suggested a level of boldness on the part of the enemy that Arnold believed he could use to his advantage. Intending to provoke an attack, Arnold formed up his men in front of the city walls (now swarming with troops) and gave three cheers. Some shots were exchanged and a few of Morgan's riflemen moved out in front of the line to snipe at the spectators, but to no avail.

Febiger even walked to within 100yds (90m) of the wall, but returned without a scratch. MacLean promptly ordered the buildings near the Porte St Jean to be burned, to deny cover to the riflemen.

Arnold's march through Maine part 4 (Quebec 1775)

On 27 October, Hanchet and his men set off for Sartigan on foot while Arnold continued by canoe taking Steele and six others with him. After 15 miles (24km) he reached some rapids where his five craft all capsized. Two bateaux were destroyed, weapons and ammunition lost, but nobody drowned. Lashing the remaining supplies to the three surviving craft, they set off again. At the last minute one of the party noticed that the river led to a lethal waterfall, and they portaged round it. The next day Arnold's own canoe sank and he was forced to join one of the two overcrowded bateaux. However, as darkness fell, he spotted the lights of Sartigan ahead. Some way behind, Morgan's division was just crossing Height of Land. The men were now making soup from shoe leather and were so weak they struggled to climb the slope even without their bateaux. Several companies had already departed when Hull arrived. Dearborn set off to warn them using an abandoned canoe. Finding Goodrich, the two searched for a ford, sometimes wading up to their armpits, but without success, finding only one of Hanchet's men left behind as a punishment. The next day Dearborn began ferrying the men over the pond in the lone canoe, until Morgan, who had kept seven bateaux, arrived to help. Meanwhile, Hull had become lost while leading Greene's division out of Seven Mile Stream. For two days they marched through the snow, covering 15 miles (24km) around the indented shoreline and occasionally following blind tributaries. Eventually they found footprints in the mud and followed them down to the Chaudiere, passing the wreckage of Morgan's bateaux, which had suffered a similar fate to Arnold's, losing one man, the remaining flour, and Dr Senter's medical chest in the process. The men were now eating their belts and shoes, squirrel skins and Dearborn's Newfoundland dog. Many were also barefoot and their route could be traced by the bloodstains in the snow. Men who fell or lagged behind were abandoned as the column snaked along the Chaudiere for over 20 miles (32km). A private, retracing his route the following spring, found human bones scattered all along it. At noon on 2 November, a group of habitants delivered three head of catde, and canoes arrived with mutton, flour, and oatmeal. By the next evening the troops were in Sartigan, where they were fed and housed, although Dearborn considered the hospitality of the habitants somewhat expensive. Arnold summoned the local Indians. He promised that his men were there as liberators and, after defeating the British, they would go home and leave the red man in peace. Over 50 warriors enlisted on the spot and Arnold then set up his headquarters in the house of a seigneur who had been expelled for punishing anyone refusing to join the militia. Arnold next had a letter from George Washington to the people of Canada read out in the nearby church. Here he learned of the capture of St Johns in a letter from Montgomery. He immediately sent Meigs to find canoes, and a party of riflemen to reconnoiter the St Lawrence. By dawn on 8 November, the riflemen could see Quebec - and the two warships guarding the river.

Arnold's march through Maine part 3 (Quebec 1775)

Arnold now had to decide whether to continue, or return to the Kennebec while enough food remained. He called a council of war at which all present agreed to continue. He then announced that he would go ahead to Sartigan and have supplies ferried back to the main body. Greene and Enos would retain only as many fit men as could be fed for 15 days and send everyone else back to Cambridge. The reduced force would he argued, be able to reach Sartigan in two weeks. The next day 75 sick left by bateaux while Arnold headed for Sartigan in freezing rain. He pitched camp 20 miles (32km) from Chaudiere Pond. When he awoke the next day two inches (5cm) of snow had fallen. Several days after the meeting, Enos came to see Greene to discuss Arnold's plan. Enos felt that even providing enough food for just 30 men to continue would leave those returning with insufficient rations to reach the Kennebec; his officers had suggested that their entire division should return Greene was dismayed, having assumed that only a handful of men from each division would return. Enos was for going on, but his own officers refused and he felt honor-bound to side with them.5 He promised Greene four barrels of flour and two of pork for the onward journey, but when Greene sent officers to collect these, Enos's subordinates refused to hand over anything. Eventually Williams provided two barrels of flour. Arnold was just a few miles from the St Lawrence when word reached him that he now had little more than 650 men left. Meanwhile, the advance party was approaching the frontier and the four-mile (6 4km) portage over Height of Land. Snow further hampered the two-mile (3.2km) uphill climb with the bateaux and the journey was only completed after nightfall. By dawn on 26 October they came to Seven Mile Stream (now Arnold River), where Steele again reported to Arnold this time accompanied by a woodsman who confirmed that the local habitants were friendly. Arnold pressed on to Chaudiere Pond after sending a message to the rest of the column to abandon any bateaux not being used to transport the sick. On the way he found a reconnaissance View of the falls in the River Chaudiere, by George Fisher. This view shows the perils that attended Arnold's force as it made its way along the river in small canoes and poorly manufactured bateaux. The figures in the foreground give some idea of the scale of this natural feature. (National Archives of Canada - C-041363) party under Captain Hanchet, marooned on an island, having waded over two miles (3.2km) waist deep in the icy water. Another officer, Isaac Hull, was sent back to prevent the other divisions from making the same mistake.

Arnold's march through Maine part 2 (Quebec 1775)

Arnold had estimated the distance to Quebec at 180 miles (290km); it was actually over 300 miles (480km). A mild taste of how much the terrain would exacerbate that underestimation occurred just half a mile (0.8km) beyond Fort Halifax, an abandoned outpost at the mouth of the Sebasticook River. The men had to hoist the bateaux out of the water, carry them along a thickly wooded bluff, then row upstream over five miles (8km) of rapids, before hoisting the bateaux and their contents up the 100ft (30m) rock face of the Skowhegan Falls. As they completed this task, an icy rain began to fall and the next morning their clothes were frozen. At Norridgewock, the last human habitation before the Chaudiere, Arnold found Greene's command discarding spoiled food, leaving only salt pork and flour (both also in short supply). A growing number of men had dysentery and to make matters worse, the bateaux were capsizing as the green wood warped. Arnold had carpenters brought up from Gardinerston to make the necessary repairs, but it took almost a week and Arnold had to wait until 9 October before leaving Norridgewock. However, at Carritunk Falls Morgan's men managed to kill a moose and catch trout to augment the rations and the following day saw further progress up the Kennebec River, now just a fast but shallow stream. By nightfall Arnold could see the mountain that marked the 12-mile (19km) "Great Carry" - a portage that avoided an impassable stretch of the Dead River just west of its junction with the Kennebec. The portage also included three large ponds that were quicker and easier to navigate than the meandering, tree-infested river. On 11 October, the first three divisions arrived at the first pond, where Arnold set up his headquarters. The following day one of Arnold's scouts, Lieutenant Steele, reported that one of his men had seen the sun shining on the Chaudiere Pond, 15 miles (24km) distant, from a tree. Arnold ordered 20 axemen to clear the trail up as far as Sartigan, a former French outpost and the first human habitation on the Quebec side of the frontier. Goodrich's company built a storehouse to hold supplies for a possible retreat, and also a log hospital for the growing number of sick (now including men who had drunk the brackish water of the second pond). On 16 October, the force reached the third pond, which had clean drinking water and from where the portage ran downhill for two miles (3.2km) to a small plain. This looked firm from a distance, but proved to be a swamp. The men stumbled through it until they reached another watercourse that brought them finally to the Dead. The river lived up to its name, running so still that the troops could hardly make out which way it flowed. It also meandered so much that the mountains to the north were behind the men as often as they were in front. That night Arnold bivouacked with Greene, whose men were now on half rations. Arnold sent Bigelow to collect food from the rear division and, while they were waiting, Meigs brought up two freshly butchered oxen. The following day heavy rain prevented further progress for all but the advance party. As darkness fell, the fierce wind uprooted trees and forced the men to pitch their tents in clearings for safety. By the next morning the Dead River had risen over 8ft (2.4km), spoiling supplies, drenching clothing and tents, and making it more difficult to follow the line of the river.

Arnold's march through Maine part 1 (Quebec 1775)

Soon after the fall of Ticonderoga, Colonel Jonathan Brewer had submitted a plan for an attack on Quebec with 500 men via upper Massachusetts (modern-day Maine). Initially rejected, it was resurrected in July as a counterpoint to Schuyler's thrust up the Richelieu River. George Washington believed that, with insufficient troops to defend both Quebec and Montreal, Carleton would be forced to either abandon the Montreal area, or risk being defeated piecemeal. The route followed two watercourses that ran almost continuously from the Atlantic to the St Lawrence and was familiar to the Abenaki and French missionaries. It had been mapped by the engineer Lieutenant John Montresor in 1761 and was believed by the British to be impassable to a large body of troops. However, many Americans disagreed, including Washington, who estimated it would take 20 days' march at worst. At a private meeting, he offered command of the expedition to Arnold, who accepted and immediately ordered 200 lightweight bateaux capable of carrying six or seven men and over 6001bs (270kg) of baggage and supplies. He also called for "active woodsmen, well acquainted with bateaux" and was inundated with volunteers. By 5 September, he had the 1,050 men required. The first stage of the journey was an overland march to Newburyport, from where the force embarked for the Kennebec River. Precious time was wasted gathering supplies and clearing pay arrears and the advance party, under Captain Daniel Morgan, only set off on the three-day march to Newburyport on 11 September. It was 16 September before the force finally set sail. As the flotilla neared its destination heavy rain and thick fog caused several vessels to become lost or run aground among the scores of islands, but by 20 September all had arrived safely at Georgetown. Arnold ordered his flagship - the Broad Bay - to head up the Kennebec to Gardinerston where the bateaux were waiting. Built from pine boards nailed to oak ribs, they were up to 25ft (7.6m) long and weighed almost 4501bs (200kg), but had been built from green wood and were smaller than Arnold's specification. He had to order 20 more. Four men were assigned to each bateau and Dr Senter noted their looks of apprehension at the state of the craft. The little army then moved to Fort Western, from where Arnold dispatched two reconnaissance parties to scout the first section of the route and on up to the frontier. He then divided his force into four groups which would march one day apart. The first, composed of the riflemen, was led by Morgan and would break the trail for the rest. The second, under Greene, comprised the companies of Captains Hubbard, Thayer, and Topham. Arnold initially chose Greene to lead the advance guard, but - true to form - the riflemen would only serve under Morgan. The third, commanded by Meigs, contained Dearborn's, Goodrich's, Hanchet's, and Ward's companies. The rearguard, under Enos, included those of McCobb, Scott, and Williams.

The Liberators in Montreal (Quebec 1775)

Carleton learned of the fall of St Johns on 4 November, by which time he also knew that more Americans were approaching Quebec through Maine. Nor would he receive the two regiments ordered from Boston in the summer. The commander of the North American squadron, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, had refused to sail north so late in the year, even though vessels routinely docked safely in Quebec as late as November. Carleton wrote to Lord Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the Colonies, blaming the disaster on incompetence at Halifax and Boston, lack of support from the habitants, and traitors in Montreal. With Montgomery undoubtedly approaching, Carleton put the garrison and what stores he could save aboard a small flotilla, but - possibly from a sense of honor - did not set sail for Quebec until the American army was across the river. Knowing mat he must capture Montreal and Quebec before winter set in, Montgomery left St Johns without delay, sending Brown, Livingston and Easton to Sorel, to prevent Carleton escaping by boat. On arriving opposite Montreal on 11 November, he sent three men across to negotiate with the citizens. He was aware that the defenses were weak and the people demoralized, but saw benefits in magnanimity. Promising to allow every citizen "the peaceable enjoyment of their property of every kind," his troops entered the city on 13 November, taking over the barracks and public storehouses. Unfortunately, the pro-American citizens were not inclined to play the gracious victor. They demanded Montgomery listen only to them and treat the Loyalists as a conquered people. Their bitterness and Montgomery's decision to leave the loathsome David Wooster (and his equally troublesome Connecticut troops) in charge, would destroy relations with the Canadians and any hope of improving the level of support for the invaders. Meanwhile, Carleton and Prescott had sailed for Quebec on 11 November, taking Thomas Walker with them. Guns had been spiked, and powder and ball thrown into the St Lawrence. Prescott had also suggested burning the barracks, but concerns for private property forced Carleton to deny the request. As the flotilla approached Sorel on 12 November, a vessel ran aground. By the time it was re-floated, the wind had dropped and the vessels had to anchor for three days. On 15 November, a flag of truce appeared, along with a letter signed by Easton demanding that the squadron surrender. To add substance, Brown rowed out to the ships and offered to show them a battery of 32-pdrs. An officer was sent ashore to confirm this, but either shirked his job or was hoodwinked by Brown (who had neither batteries, nor guns). Carleton's flotilla mounted 30 guns, but again the threat of substantial loss of life made him hesitate. He called a council of war: one captain offered to attack the batteries while the rest headed for Quebec; another -a noted pilot, familiar with the dangerous waters around Sorel - offered to row him downriver. Carleton agreed to the latter proposal. Dressed as an habitant, he was spirited away, leaving Prescott with instructions to drop stores and heavy guns into the river, and then decide to surrender or risk passing the enemy positions. Prescott tried to negotiate with Easton, but the latter convinced him that his position was hopeless and on 44 19 November (the day Carleton reached Quebec) he surrendered along with 120 troops and almost 200 sailors. Aboard the captured fleet Easton found the guns Prescott had failed to destroy, as well as 200 pairs of shoes. He also discovered Thomas Walker, who immediately returned to Montreal to help Wooster pacify the city. Most importantly, Easton had acquired the ships Montgomery needed to transport his own men to Quebec. As the first snows fell, Montgomery borrowed £5,000 from James Price to have winter clothing made from captured British uniforms, and weapons and ammunition manufactured at the Forges St Maurice. Leaving Livingston, now a colonel, to raise a regiment of Canadians, he set off for Quebec via Trois Rivieres. Unfortunately, the men whose enlistments expired on 10 December now decided that their job -driving the Regulars and Papists back from the frontier - was done and headed for home, counting the journey as part of their service. With just 800 men, Montgomery wondered if he had the quantity, and quality, of troops to hold Montreal and take Quebec. Almost 200 miles (322km) away, Carleton had the same concerns about holding Quebec and retaking Montreal.

St Johns and Chambly part 6 (Quebec 1775)

As Carleton's men sat on St Helen's criticizing their commander's lack of aggression, Montgomery used two Canadian prisoners sent back by Warner to persuade Preston that further resistance was hopeless. The garrison was on salt rations and suffering from the lack of warmth and shelter, and the Americans - now numbering 2,000, excluding the detachments to the north - had completed another battery to the north-east. On 1 November, its guns opened fire, destroying vital supplies and causing serious damage to the defenses, though still not inflicting many casualties. That evening, Preston's officers announced that there was only enough food for eight more days, on two-thirds rations. At the same time, Montgomery wrote to Preston pointing out the human consequences of further bombardment, adding that if the fort was stormed, he would not be responsible for the consequences. The following day, Preston sent an officer to negotiate terms. He attempted to paint an optimistic picture of the state of the garrison, but Montgomery sent him back with another letter, threatening to deny the honors of war and protection for the officers' possessions. Preston was for carrying on, but his officers were not. Terms were agreed on the evening of 2 November, although Preston demanded the removal of a clause expressing Montgomery's regret that the garrison's bravery had not been applied "in a better cause." On 3 November, 60 days after Schuyler's first attack, the garrison marched out with the honors of war, having lost 20 dead (half of whom were Indians or Canadians) and 23 wounded. Montgomery had suffered 100 combat casualties, but a further 1,000 men had been discharged due to illness. As he prepared to leave, Preston wrote a final insult to his captors in his journal: "We may thank our Enemy in some sort for leaving us in such slight field Works the credit of having been only reduced by Famine."

St Johns and Chambly part 5 (Quebec 1775)

After almost two days, the only damage was to the fort's chimneys, but this was enough to impress Stopford. While Chambly was not built to withstand a heavy bombardment, many cursed Stopford for not holding out longer and above all for not destroying the stores before surrendering. On 21 October, Preston and his men watched as the boats taking the Chambly garrison to prison camps in New England passed upriver. Such was the damage to the defenders' morale that the Canadian contingent petitioned Preston to let them surrender separately. At Montreal, desertions among the militia (and the capture of a leading seigneur whilst recruiting replacements) had restricted Carleton to minor raids against Longueuil and Boucherville. Now he knew that time was running out for St Johns and he ordered MacLean to bring 180 troops down to Sorel from Quebec, and to recruit as many militia as he could on the way. By mid-October, with MacLean now leading 400 men, Carleton preparing to cross to Longueuil with 130 Regulars, 800 militia and 80 Indians and link up with MacLean just south of Chambly. Late in the afternoon of 30 October, Carleton's force set out in boats from St Helen's Island in the middle of the river. Immediately, they ran into musket fire from Seth Warner's 350 Green Mountain Boys and canister from two small cannon captured at Chambly. Unable to risk losing many men, Carleton withdrew, despite a successful landing by some Canadians and Conosadaga warriors farther downstream that could have been exploited. Just south of Sorel, MacLean learned of this setback while encountering strong opposition from Brown and Livingston and he too turned back.

St Johns and Chambly part 4 (Quebec 1775)

Back at St Johns, Montgomery had been delayed further by bad weather and by Preston's gunners, who had cleared a field of fire by leveling the buildings outside the fort. On 22 September, work began on the first battery, but with the besiegers outgunned by the defenders and by the vessels on the river, progress was slow. The American blockade was also extremely lax - Preston communicated regularly with Carleton and on 4 October, two Canadian officers rounded up eight cattle from nearby fields and brought them into the fort. However, matters changed when heavier guns arrived from Fort Ticonderoga, including a large mortar immediately christened "the sow". By 15 October, the two buildings inside the fort were in ruins and, though casualties were negligible, the defenders were forced to sleep in the cellars. More worrying for Preston was a second American battery on the east bank, directly opposite the fort, which not only closed the route in for messengers and supplies, but also threatened the vessels moored there. Preston sent one of the row galleys, armed with a 24-pdr, to destroy the work, but after severe casualties on both sides it was forced to withdraw. The senior naval officer, Lieutenant William Hunter, now recommended that all three vessels be beached between the redoubts and their guns and stores removed. Before this task was completed, however, Royal Savage was holed by heated shot and sank with its ordnance still aboard, so infuriating Preston that Hunter had to defend his reputation in writing. On 18 October, Preston suffered an even greater blow: Stopford surrendered the fort at Chambly, along with its garrison and valuable supplies of powder and shot. Brown and Livingston had surrounded the post with 400 men (half of them Canadian recruits) and had been joined later by Montgomery's two row galleys, which Duggan had slipped past St Johns at night.

St Johns and Chambly part 3 (Quebec 1775)

Allen sent men to find Brown (who was still at Laprairie) and to obtain help from Thomas Walker inside the city. Walker tried to talk several fellowcitizens into unlocking the city gates, but by now a local man had spotted Allen and informed Carleton. Carleton, until now in despair of relieving St Johns because of the lack of support from the populace, found that a threat to Montreal itself produced a different response. While a few took their families down to the docks in order to escape, 120 French and 80 English volunteers armed themselves and reported for duty. They were joined by 34 men of the 26th Foot, six Indians, and 20 Indian Department officers, one of whom - Major John Campbell - took command of the force. As the British emerged, the Americans took cover in woods and buildings. Campbell placed his Regulars in the center and sent the volunteers to attack Allen's flanks, at which Duggan's recruits (on the right) panicked and fled. The men on Allen's left did the same, leaving Allen alone; 36 of his men were captured, five were killed, and ten wounded. Campbell lost two officers (including Major John Carden of the Legislative Council) and one soldier killed; a French seigneur and a Regular were wounded. The victory saw over 1,200 militia flood in from the surrounding countryside, to add to the 600 in Montreal who, with Indians and Regulars, gave Carleton over 2,000 troops. Many now clamored to relieve St Johns. Instead, they remained in Montreal for four weeks until the militia drifted away for the harvest and to protect their homes from marauding bands of collaborators. The lack of action appeared culpable, but in truth Carleton had no firm intelligence on enemy numbers and location, and any of the American contingents roaming the countryside between Montreal and St Johns could easily have ambushed him. But if Carleton could not challenge Montgomery, he could improve security in Montreal and he issued a warrant for Walker's arrest. On 5 October, a detachment of Royal Highland Emigrants arrived at Walker's house. He fired on them, wounding two, and only surrendered when the soldiers set the house ablaze.

St Johns and Chambly part 2 (Quebec 1775)

A third attempt was scheduled for 13 September, but the weather intervened. Schuyler again fell ill and, on 16 September, handed over command to Montgomery. Determined to make the most of this opportunity, Montgomery returned to St Johns that day with 2,000 men aboard a schooner, a sloop, two armed row galleys, and ten bateaux -sufficient to blockade both the fort and the river. He also had 40 Canadians recruited near Chambly by Livingston and Jeremy Duggan, a Quebec barber, and led by Major John Brown. The Americans disembarked under sporadic artillery fire and encircled the fort. Brown captured a supply column from Laprairie and then occupied an old redoubt astride the road. The fort's commander, Major Charles Preston, sent out a patrol, which captured Hazen and forced Brown to abandon the work. Montgomery then arrived with 500 fresh troops and forced the British back to the fort with some loss but in good order. By the evening of 18 September the Americans had the fort surrounded and Preston sent Lorimier to inform Carleton of his predicament. The next day, Montgomery sent patrols to warn of any relief attempt from Montreal - Brown went to Laprairie, while Allen (a subordinate any commander would happily send elsewhere) headed north with Livingston and Duggan to recruit more Canadians, and then occupied Longueuil. Few habitants took the bait. Local leaders, especially the clergy, made every effort to dissuade their neighbors from joining the Americans, and one group even wrote to Carleton, begging his pardon for not turning out with the militia. These loyalists expected immediate aid from Carleton, but he chose to remain in Montreal, which - though correct militarily - led many citizens to question the wisdom of openly backing the British. While few Canadians helped Livingston, none tried to hinder him and he was able to intercept all vessels coming up the Richelieu from Sorel. On 24 September, Allen and Brown met at Laprairie and hatched a plan to capture Montreal. The idea was presented by Allen, who was upset at losing command of the Green Mountain Boys to his cousin Seth Warner, and now had a commission but no command. Brown would cross from Laprairie and land south of the city with 200 men. Allen, with 30 men detached by Brown and 80 of his own (mostly Canadians), would cross from Longueuil and attack from the north. Allen ferried his men across during the night of 25 September and by dawn was awaiting the signal that Brown was ready. It never came.

St Johns and Chambly part 1 (Quebec 1775)

The plan approved by Congress involved a two-pronged attack to make Carleton disperse his forces. The left wing, 3,000 men under Schuyler, would head for Montreal, via Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River. The right wing, 1,050 men led by Arnold, would head up the Kennebec River, over Height of Land, and down the Chaudiere River to Quebec. This "second front" was not Arnold's idea, but he quickly became a supporter once denied command of the main force. Montgomery set out from Crown Point with 1,500 men on 30 August and by 2 September was at Ile-aux-Noix, where Schuyler joined him two days later. Despite poor health, Schuyler was determined to lead his men into Canada, which he did on 5 September. As his boats approached St Johns, British guns opened fire but did little damage, and the troops landed in a swamp about a mile from the fort. As they advanced on the fort they were ambushed by 100 Indians under Lorimier. Overcoming the initial shock, Schuyler's men fought back, with Lorimier losing four dead and five wounded. Disgruntled at the lack of support from the garrison, the Indians withdrew. By evening the Americans had built a breastwork beside the river, but later had to pull back as the British gunners found the range. That night, Moses Hazen (posing as a friend of Congress) informed Schuyler that the fort had plenty of troops and supplies, a heavily armed schooner - Royal Savage - was heading his way, and there was little support for the invasion among the habitants. The last point was of particular concern, as Schuyler had believed it was the one element he could count on. After a council of war, Schuyler pulled back to Ile-aux-Noix the next day. Scarcely had he arrived and informed Congress indicating that he was considering withdrawing to Crown Point, when James Livingston - an American living near Chambly and a distant relative of Montgomery's wife - arrived and presented an entirely different picture. Urging one more effort against St Johns, Livingston promised that the Canadians would join Schuyler. Schuyler now had 1,900 men, but only 1,000 fit for action. They re-embarked and headed back to St Johns, this time under Montgomery. Early on 10 September they reoccupied the works built during the previous attack and a group from the 1st New York entered the woods west of the fort, with the aim of cutting the supply line to Chambly. The earlier experience with the Indians had made the men jumpy, and a chance encounter in the dark woods led two groups to fire on each other. Eventually, the problem was sorted out, but then Ritzema's men faced a real ambush and fled to the river. As Montgomery rallied them in person, a rumor began that Royal Savage was about to bombard them and he was forced to shepherd them back onto the bateaux and return to Ile-aux-Noix.

The decision to invade (Quebec 1775)

For three weeks, Congress discussed handing back Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and disavowing Allen and Arnold. Another letter was sent to Canada, referring to despotism, tyranny, oppression, and common cause, and on 1 June, Congress declared that an invasion of Canada was contrary to its aims. However, by mid-June the delegates had been persuaded that invasion was a strategic necessity. Both Allen and Arnold had suggested that it would require just 2,000 men and, if reports of British weakness and the strength of pro-American feeling were true, the capture of Montreal and Quebec were assured. Arnold's plan involved a siege of St Johns by 700 troops, with another 1,000 bypassing the fort to seize Montreal (with the gates opened by sympathizers), and 300 more guarding the lines of communication along Lake Champlain and the Richelieu. With Montreal captured, St Johns, Chambly, and Quebec could not hold out and Congress would control the entire Province long before reinforcements could arrive, removing any threat of a British counterattack. The plan appealed to both Congress and to General Washington, and the invasion was approved on 27 June, but with the New Yorkers Schuyler and Montgomery, rather than the Yankee Arnold, in command. When Schuyler reached Ticonderoga on 18 July, he was confronted by utter chaos. Not only did the few troops present lack even the rudiments of discipline (and, moreover, have no intention of learning them from a haughty New Yorker), but the logistical systems so dear to his heart - and essential to wilderness warfare - were nonexistent. His experiences as deputy quartermaster general in the French and Indian War helped to remedy some defects, but it was the end of August before a very "rough and ready" Separate Army left Ticonderoga, and 2 September before it set foot on Canadian soil. When Carleton learned of the loss of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, he placed his lieutenant governor, Hector Cramahé, in charge at Quebec and left for Montreal with Major Joseph Stopford and most of the 7th Foot. At Montreal he found under 600 Regulars fit for duty, an indifferent and insubordinate militia, no armed vessels, no fort in good enough repair to withstand a siege, no immediate prospect of reinforcements, and a small but influential body of citizens openly consorting with the enemy. The seigneury soon rallied round, and the younger English colonists volunteered to serve at St Johns, but the habitants appeared "badly disposed." A proclamation by Bishop Briand of Quebec, urging them to ignore American propaganda and serve the King, elicited little response beyond the denunciation of the Bishop as a traitor. On 9 June, acting on advice from a leading seigneur, Carleton established martial law and called out the militia (though he was not optimistic about the response). Unfortunately, he made the mistake of choosing new senior officers from the nobility who had military experience but only in the regular French army. With no knowledge of the militia, they granted commissions to friends and relatives and ignored the existing officers. Not surprisingly, many were physically abused and chased out of the parishes. The English-speaking colonists were no more helpful: barely 70 men appeared when the "British Militia" of Quebec were called out. Carleton could understand the reluctance of the "New Subjects", but the behaviour of the "Old Subjects" left him incensed. Frustrated, he turned to a community he knew he could rely upon: the former Highland soldiers settled in Nova Scotia and the Mohawk Valley, who were being recruited by MacLean. Somewhat less welcome was the "reinforcement" from Boston - Brigadier-General Richard Prescott. Carleton gave him command of the Montreal garrison, but otherwise tried to ignore him. As if all of this was not enough, Carleton also had problems with the Indians, alarmed at American success and nervous of an invasion. Gage and others were insistent that they be used and so Carleton wrote to the posts at Detroit, Kaskaskia, and Michillimackinac, warning them of rebel activity and suggesting that they took steps to ensure the loyalty of local tribes. Guy Johnson, superintendent of the northern Indian Department, met Carleton at Lachine on 26 July, along with over 1,600 warriors who expressed a desire to lay waste New England. They were appalled when Carleton declined the offer and forbade them to cross the frontier, and Johnson, along with Joseph Brant and an Indian Department officer, Daniel Claus, went to England to seek permission for a more aggressive posture. An attempt by Carleton to placate the tribes by taking 50 warriors as scouts made no impact. Some, mainly Onondaga and St Regis, drifted home but others craved action. On 22 August, a group under the Chevalier Francois de Lorimier attacked some of Allen's men near the Lacolle River. Several Indians were wounded and one of Allen's officers - Remember Baker - was killed, at which Congress immediately sent a Stockbridge delegation to the Caughnawaga to explain that the clash had been accidental and that the Americans intended them no harm. Meanwhile, Carleton had turned his attention to the forts. He could not afford to yield territory, especially as Montreal only had a weak wall and ditch, therefore the defense had to be based near the frontier, so he ordered repairs to the defenses at St Johns and garrisoned it with as many Regulars and volunteers as he could find. He also sent to Halifax for carpenters and shipwrights and to Gage in Boston for the return of the 10th and 52nd Foot, so that he could chase the enemy back down Lake Champlain once they were defeated. However, when Liberty and Enterprise returned to St Johns and bombarded it on 7 June, Carleton knew that he faced an invasion by a buoyant enemy and that he had insufficient resources to repel it. Everything rested on St Johns: if it fell he would lose most of his Regulars and Montreal, leaving just Quebec standing between the Americans and control of Canada.

The Americans - part 3 (Quebec 1775)

Canada

While Congress gradually adopted the regular units raised by each colony, various "special" units were also recruited for Canada. Some, such as Duggan's Corps, were never completed and a few only ever existed on paper. Among the more organized were the Green Mountain Boys from the New Hampshire Grants (now Vermont). Raised illegally before the war to defend the Grants from incursions by New Yorkers, its knowledge of wilderness fighting prompted Congress to let Schuyler formalize the unit as a seven-company battalion, each with three officers and 70 men, commanded by a lieutenant colonel and a major. At the end of 1775, Congress formally authorized the creation of an eight-company unit from the Canadians recruited by Livingston during the autumn. This later became the 1st Canadian Regiment, and included former soldiers of the Compagnies Franche de la Marine who had settled in Canada. Being French born, rather than Canadian, they were less reluctant to fight the British. The 1st Canadian Regiment appears to have peaked at 200 all ranks. The 2nd Canadian Regiment was authorized in February 1776 and raised at Montreal by Moses Hazen. It adopted a French regimental structure, having a colonel and lieutenant colonel, and four battalions, each commanded by a major, and containing five companies of three officers and 50 enlisted men. However, probably only one battalion was ever raised. Because Hazen was never reimbursed for the costs of recruiting the unit, he retained proprietary control, hence the unit survived the disbandment of the more senior 1st Canadian Regiment, retained its French structure, and later had the pick of the foreigners in the Continental Army.

Arnold's command

The 1,100 men who marched through Maine were all volunteers (in fact, so many volunteered that they had to be chosen by lot). There were two, five-company battalions of musketeers, drawn from all four New England colonies, and three companies of riflemen - two of Pennsylvanians, one of Virginians - drawn from the rifle regiment raised by Congress. These latter were frontiersmen, ideally equipped for the journey: some Pennsylvanians marched 450 miles (725km) in 26 days to reach Boston; the Virginians covered 600 (965km) miles in three weeks.
The two New England battalions were led by lieutenant colonels Christopher Greene (brother of Nathaniel) and Roger Enos. Greene was 38, a former militia major, who owned sawmills and forges in Rhode Island; Enos, 46, was a veteran of the French and Indian War. Their deputies were majors Timothy Bigelow, a Massachusetts blacksmith, and Return Jonathan Meigs, of Connecticut. The ten captains included Henry Dearborn, a young doctor and veteran of Bunker Hill; Simeon Thayer, a wig maker and former Roger's Ranger; Samuel Ward, the son of a former governor of Rhode Island and just 19, and William Goodrich, who had connections with the Stockbridge tribe. The riflemen were led by Daniel Morgan, and two wildly contrasting Pennsylvanians - Matthew Smith, a hard drinker and fighter, and the quiet, courteous William Hendricks.
Arnold also had a small staff- his secretary, Eleazer Oswald; the brigade major, Danish engineer Christian Febiger; a chaplain, the 29-year-old firebrand Samuel Spring; Dr Isaac Senter, seven years younger and one of the first surgeons appointed to the Continental Army; and Aaron Burr, described by John Hancock as a "gentleman of reputation." Two women also accompanied the expedition; both were wives of Pennsylvanian riflemen and, apparently, every bit as tough.
Arnold's fleet on Lake Champlain consisted of 17 vessels - three schooners, one sloop, one cutter, two row galleys, two galleys, and eight "gundalows" (gondolas). Of these, 15 fought at Valcour; of the other two, one schooner was converted to carry stores and act as a hospital ship, and one "gundalow" was still fitting out at Skenesboro. Due to the difficulties in recruiting experienced sailors willing to take on the Royal Navy, most of the crews were soldiers, including a draft of 300 men from two New Hampshire regiments. It is unclear how near Arnold got to his official complement of 915 men, although the "gundalow" Philadelphia apparently was missing only one man from its establishment of 45.

The Americans - part 2 (Quebec 1775)

New York

In 1775, New York raised four infantry regiments and an artillery company, with a total strength of 3,000 men. The gunners, under Captain John Lamb, came almost entirely from New York City, and were clothed in blue faced buff to avoid being mistaken for lowly infantrymen. After 31 December, almost all of the survivors re-enlisted in a new company under Lieutenant Isaiah Wool. In 1776, two new companies were formed in New York City, and assigned to Schuyler.

The infantry regiments were recruited from New York City, Albany and the Mohawk Valley, the northern Hudson valley, and the southern Hudson Valley, respectively. The 1st included several officers who had fought in the French and Indian War, while the 2nd had a strong Dutch influence.

Each regiment had 758 men, comprising a colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major, five "staff' (adjutant, quartermaster, surgeon, surgeon's mate, and chaplain), and ten companies, each with a captain, three lieutenants, three sergeants, three corporals, a drummer, a fifer, and 64 privates. Companies were based on existing militia units, whose own precedence determined each regiment's seniority, and the regiments tended to represent the majority politics - radical, or conservative - of these areas.

In April 1776, another four (later five) infantry regiments were raised, also numbered 1st to 4th. Three incorporated veterans of the 1775 campaign, but apparently only the 1st corresponded to its 1775 counterpart, the 2nd being based on the old 3rd and the 3rd around the old 4th. The 4th was a new unit, raised in Albany, whilst the old 2nd eventually became the 5th Regiment. Colonel John Nicholson also formed a provisional battalion at Quebec from the men remaining after the expiry of the second tranche of enlistments in April 1776, but the unit was disbanded and the men transferred to another regiment based in the Mohawk Valley (both of these corps employing three-year enlistments).

New Jersey

New Jersey raised three infantry regiments during the winter of 1775. Initially intended for Washington's Main Army, they were diverted to reinforce Schuyler, the 2nd arriving in Canada in March, and the 1st in May (the 3rd went to the Mohawk Valley). The two senior regiments were based on existing militia structures, the 1st recruiting in the north-east and the 2nd in the south-west; the 3rd appears to have been recruited "at large". Both the New Jersey and Pennsylvania contingents included a number of French and Indian War veterans.

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania, not being a Royal colony, had no established militia, but formed volunteer units - "Associators" - during the 1770s. In January 1776, six infantry units (referred to as battalions, rather than regiments) were authorized, of which the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 6th served in Canada. One of their conditions of service was that they operated as a single brigade, under a Pennsylvanian general. One of the eight companies in each battalion consisted of riflemen, which brought complaints from officers concerned at how an asymmetrical seven-company unit would maneuver when the riflemen were detached. A seventh battalion - named after its commander, Colonel Aenas Mackay - was raised in the summer of 1776 to help defend the frontier of the Northern Department.

Due to a misunderstanding, Pennsylvania also formed an artillery company, which Congress later agreed to adopt. The unit was recruited by the engineer, Bernard Romans and led into Canada by Captain-Lieutenant Gibbs Scott.

The Americans - part 1 (Quebec 1775)

New Hampshire

Because of its frontier status, New Hampshire contained many French and Indian War veterans, particularly from "ranging" (scouting) units. With its "line" regiments at Boston, the colony's main contribution to the Separate Army was a ranger detachment under Captain (later Major) Timothy Bedel. Originally a single company of state troops, it expanded to three companies, each of 66 officers and men, and served until December 31.

After the defeat at Quebec, Congress sent urgent requests to New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut for extra regiments, over and above their agreed quotas, to serve for one year in Canada (in each case the units were recruited from the counties closest to Canada). On 20 January 1776, the ranger unit was re-raised in north-west New Hampshire, again under Bedel (now a colonel), but this time with eight companies. After the British evacuated Boston in March 1775, the 2nd, 5th, and 8th Continental Regiments (formerly the 3rd, 1st, and 2nd New Hampshire regiments of 1775) were sent to Canada. Averaging over 500 men, only the battalions from Pennsylvania were larger.

Massachusetts

Although Massachusetts' forces were fully committed to the siege of Boston until March 1776, it did raise one provisional regiment, under Colonel Elisha Porter, to serve in Canada. Organized as a standard Continental battalion, it may have reached 500 effectives. Once the British evacuated Boston, the 15th, 24th, and 25th Continental regiments were also sent north.

Connecticut

After Allen and Arnold had gone, only a few local militia were left to guard Ticonderoga, so Congress assumed responsibility for some of Connecticut's forces and sent them to defend it. This contingent comprised three of Connecticut's six (later eight) regiments - the 1st, 4th, and 5th. All ranks were drawn from existing militia companies, in proportion to the population of each county, and had to serve until 10 December. As with all the New England contingents raised in 1775, these regiments were outside the militia system and were more akin to the Provincial units of earlier colonial wars.

Infantry regiments had six staff officers, plus a colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major (the 1st had two majors as its colonel, David Wooster, was also a general) and ten companies, each with four sergeants, four corporals, two musicians, and 90 privates. Seven companies had four officers, the other three being nominally commanded by the three "field" officers (hence Wooster had to fulfill three roles). Two companies each of the 1st and 4th regiments remained at Boston.

In early January 1776, Colonel Samuel Elmore formed a provisional regiment at Quebec from men whose enlistments had not expired, or who had re-enlisted. In response to urgent requests from Congress, another regiment was raised in January 1776, by Colonel Charles Burrall; this included one company trained as artillerymen, under Captain John Bigelow.

The Americans - Introduction (Quebec 1775)

In contrast to their enemy, the American forces in Canada changed composition, personnel, and organization frequently. The expiry of enlistments led to the consolidation of the remaining men into ad hoc "regiments" (often no bigger than companies), and unit numbers and titles were recycled.

On 14 June 1775, Congress adopted an "American continental army" of 10,000 (later 22,000) men at Boston, and 5,000 more at New York City. The latter came mainly from New York and Connecticut. In theory, all of the units in Canada were adopted by Congress, and so qualify as "Continentals" - the equivalent of British Regulars. However, even as late as 1776, a standing army was still anathema to many politicians and units were considered to be on loan to Congress. Thus, political control remained with "the people" through the colonial legislatures. The force that entered Canada was known as the "Separate Army" until the end of 1775, and thereafter as the "Northern Army". Commanded by Schuyler, it had its own quartermaster general, paymaster general, military secretary, engineers (three), and hospital services, the last run by Schuyler's personal
physician, Dr Samuel Stringer.

Initially, each colony had its own regimental structure, usually based on the ten-company British battalion (but without flank companies). However, on the reorganization of the Continental Army in early 1776, ten colonies adopted a common battalion structure, often called the "November" model. This had a colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major, plus ten regimental staff, with just eight companies, each of four officers, four sergeants, four corporals, two musicians, and 76 privates. The other three colonies - New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania - adopted the "October" model, which had the same regimental headquarters, but only three officers (captain, lieutenant, and ensign), four sergeants, and 68 privates per company.

At the same time, the rifle unit raised by Congress in June 1775 and all the New England infantry were amalgamated into a single "Continental Line" of 26 consecutively numbered regiments. An artillery regiment was also formed, under Henry Knox, with 12 companies, each comprising a captain, a captain-lieutenant, a first lieutenant, two second lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals, eight bombardiers, eight gunners, 32 matrosses (privates), and a drummer and fifer. Two companies (under Ebenezer Stevens and Benjamin Eustis) went to Canada in early 1776.

The British and their allies (Quebec 1775)

The "British" forces comprised six distinct elements. In order of size, they were the Army ("Regulars"), the German Auxiliaries, the Militia (predominantly French-speaking Canadians), the Royal Navy, Indians, and Loyalists (i.e. loyal white civilians of British, Irish or American birth).

The Army

In 1775, this element of imperial defense was in short supply everywhere in North America. Of the five infantry regiments assigned to Canada, two - the 10th and 52nd Foot - had gone to Boston in October 1774 on the assumption that 3,000 militia would mobilize to oppose any invasion. This left the 8th Foot dispersed around the Great Lakes posts, and the 7th and 26th Foot - both at least ten percent under strength - defending the Province of Quebec. The 26th and all but two companies of the 7th were captured in November 1775, and spent over a year in captivity.

In May 1776, the 29th Foot arrived at Quebec, and in June, eight more regiments arrived from Europe (the 9th, 20th, 21st, 24th, 31st, 34th, 53rd, and 62nd Foot) and one (the 47th Foot) from Halifax. Of these ten units only the 47th Foot had seen action since 1762 (at Concord and Bunker Hill), although the 29th, 31st, and 34th Foot had all served in North America during the early 1770s. However, the light companies of the five senior regiments had trained in the new tactics devised by Sir William Howe in 1774, and were prominent in the 1776 campaign.

Burgoyne also brought four companies of artillery. Prior to that, Carleton had only a single company of regular gunners, most of whom were captured at St Johns.

German Auxiliaries

Most of the German contingent in Canada came from Brunswick (Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel), with one infantry regiment and an artillery company from Hesse-Hanau. The first division of 2,282 Brunswickers and 668 Hessians arrived in June; the second division, 2,000 Brunswickers, arrived in September. During 1776, only the artillerymen saw serious action, primarily at Valcour Island, where they manned two gunboats and some ordnance on Thunderer, and performed creditably. Von Riedesel used the winter of 1776 to adapt the tactics and clothing of the entire corps to North American conditions.

The Militia

Following the acquisition of New France in the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the British by and large retained the administrative infrastructure, including the militia. Each parish provided a company of men when required by the authorities, based on a fixed quota (leaving enough men to maintain farming and business). From 1759, there were three administrative "brigades" based on Montreal, Trois Rivieres, and Quebec. All males between 16 and 60 years old were eligible. On paper, 15,000 men were available to France in the previous conflict, but only a third were mobilized at any time, of whom 80 percent were employed in transport and supply. In 1775, Carleton's lack of Regulars led the militia to form the bulk of every combat formation in the field. Never enthusiastic, the militia was further de-motivated by Carleton's apparent lack of aggression, and if not employed immediately tended to go home.

The Quebec City militia - effectively a separate force - was mobilized in September 1775, and served until May 1776 (but continued to attend parades and social events until 1783). There were 11 companies of "Canadian Militia" (reduced to eight in December), six companies of English-speaking colonists, or "British Militia", and one company of artillery.

The Royal Navy

The senior service was involved in most actions of the campaign. A detachment from the schooner Gaspe served at St Johns, albeit less than impressively. At Quebec, nine companies were formed from the crews of the warships and merchantmen in the harbor, whilst the frigate Lizard and the "snow" Fell were moored in the St Lawrence to command the river.

In 1776, 700 men were drafted from the fleet that relieved Quebec, to man the Lake Champlain flotilla. Whilst Arnold's fleet usually attracts all the attention, the breakdown, transportation, and reassembly of the four major British vessels was a far more impressive technical achievement.

Indians

Lord Dartmouth sanctioned the use of Indians in July 1775 - a move that generated much controversy at the time, and more as the war progressed (although Congress had authorized the raising of a "minuteman" company from Stockbridge warriors four months earlier). Military and civil control was exercised via the Department of Indian Affairs, established in 1754 to counter French superiority in this aspect of colonial warfare. There were two districts - north and south - each with a superintendent reporting to the commander in chief in North America.

In 1775, the northern district, under Guy Johnson, ran from Canada to the Pennsylvania-Virginia border. It contained around 8,500 warriors, but few of these were available initially, as the invasion isolated the western and southern tribes until late 1776. The main sources of manpower available to Carleton were the Iroquois (or Six Nations) of the Mohawk Valley, and Caughnawaga (Seven Nations) of the St Lawrence Valley. The Iroquois were traditional allies of the British, but the Caughnawaga had previously served the French and were believed (with some justification) to be lukewarm. In fact, both groups were the focus of efforts by Congress -including visits by their Stockbridge "brothers" - to negotiate their neu¬ trality. A few Oneida and Tuscarora actually fought against the British).

Carleton was the only senior British officer in North America to speak out against using them, as much for military as humanitarian reasons. Their fearsome reputation was a double-edged sword and their unique approach to warfare - based on returning home with as much loot and as few casualties as possible - made controlling them a problem. Nevertheless, they were invaluable as scouts: Carleton employed 50 warriors in this role in mid-1775, and over 640 led his advance into New York a year later. War parties usually operated under the direction of officers of the Indian Department (often seconded Regulars), French militia officers or local Army officers. Tactically, they were by no means naive: the Iroquois employed a rudimentary form of "fire and movement" and were adept at using cover to close with the enemy. Whilst acts of cruelty were committed occasionally, most of the atrocities ascribed to them - for example, at The Cedars - were either exaggerated, or completely false, often being used to justify attacks and land-grabbing by colonists.

Loyalists

Dozens of English-speaking Canadians served as volunteers, but the only formal unit of white Loyalists was the Royal Highland Emigrants (later the 84th Foot). Originally two separate corps, it soon became a two-battalion regiment, recruiting in every colony, and even direct from Scotland (being a Provincial unit, this was illegal, but MacLean circum¬ vented the law by having native Scots swear the oath after arriving in America). Numbers were high thanks to unusually generous bounties, the use of traditional Highland dress, and the patronage of their first colonel, Gage, who prevented "poaching" by other units.

The regiment fought in every major action of the campaign, except Valcour Island, usually with distinction, particularly at St Johns and Quebec. It remained on the Provincial establishment until 24 December 1778, and on 10 April 1779, company strength was officially increased from 50 rank-and-file to 70. By 1783, the unit had served everywhere from the Great Lakes to Nova Scotia and from the North Atlantic to Florida. The only blot on its record was the high desertion rate of men recruited from the Continentals captured at Quebec which, along with Burgoyne's dislike of MacLean, saw the unit left in Canada during the 1777 campaign.

Major General John Sullivan (Quebec 1775)

Major General John Sullivan (1740-95) was born in Somersworth, New Hampshire, the son of Irish immigrants. He practiced law and was reputedly so greedy and litigious that he was once attacked by a mob. Despite this, he became a major in the militia and was elected to both the First and Second Continental Congress, aligning himself with the radicals and welcoming a split with Great Britain.

In December 1774 he seized 100 barrels of powder from Fort William and Mary in Portsmouth, promised the Governor that his followers would disperse, and then promptly went back and took 60 muskets and 15 cannon. Seven months later, he was sent to Boston with the rank of brigadier general, but also remained active in politics, campaigning for a distinct government for New Hampshire. After the British evacuation, he was ordered to Canada with six regiments, but soon found himself in command of an army facing the twin scourges of smallpox and a superior enemy. Attempting to take the offensive, faulty intelligence led to the defeat at Trois Rivieres, after which he saw retreat as the only option. He withdrew to Crown Point, only to find that he had been replaced by Gates.

After complaining to Congress in person, Sullivan returned to take command on Long Island, only to be superseded again - this time by Putnam - and then captured at Brooklyn. He was exchanged in September for Richard Prescott, served under Washington in the New Jersey and Pennsylvania campaigns, and commanded at Rhode Island (1778) and against the Iroquois (1779). Illness contracted during the latter campaign forced him to resign his commission and enter Congress. He chaired the inquiry into the 1781 mutinies, and later became governor of New Hampshire and a federal judge.

Brigadier General Benedict Arnold (Quebec 1775)

Brigadier General Benedict Arnold (1741-1801) was born in Norwich, Connecticut, the great-grandson of a governor of Rhode Island. As a young man, he courted physical danger and personality clashes, and was regarded by his peers as a natural leader. Apprenticed to a local apothecary, he soon set up his own business and later became a smuggler. As the political rift with Great Britain grew, these interests led him to oppose restrictions on trade, and he became a natural ally of the radicals.

By 1774, Arnold was a wealthy merchant, an accomplished sailor, and captain of the second company of the Connecticut Governor's Foot Guards. Within 24 hours of hearing of events at Lexington, he seized the New Haven powder magazine - upsetting a French and Indian War veteran named David Wooster in the process - and marched to Boston. Proposing the seizure of Fort Ticonderoga and its much-needed artillery and supplies, he was given a commission by Massachusetts, which was later rescinded, much to his annoyance. In June, the death of his wife forced him to return to New Haven, where he was laid low by an attack of gout. He then received a third blow when the Massachusetts Congress refused to pay most of the expenses he claimed to have incurred in its service.

In September, General George Washington persuaded him to command one of the expeditions into Canada. The march to Quebec and the attack on the city illustrated his dynamic leadership, but the legal problems that followed his period as governor of Montreal showed another side to his character (as would a similar post in Philadelphia after the Saratoga campaign). He became embroiled in a court-martial instigated by Brown, Easton, and Hazen following the mysterious loss of supplies Arnold had seized from local merchants and sent to St Johns. When the court refused to hear one of his witnesses, Arnold challenged the members to a duel and only the intervention of Gates prevented further unpleasantness.

Arnold was a complex character: the creation of the Lake Champlain fleet showed his immense dynamism, the attack on Quebec his bravery (both traits that would surface again at Saratoga). However, avarice and "creative" accounting skills led to controversy throughout his Continental service, and also after the war, while his sensitivity to personal slights - real or imagined - contributed as much to his decision to change sides as his flirtations with the Loyalists in Philadelphia.