The decision to invade (Quebec 1775)

For three weeks, Congress discussed handing back Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and disavowing Allen and Arnold. Another letter was sent to Canada, referring to despotism, tyranny, oppression, and common cause, and on 1 June, Congress declared that an invasion of Canada was contrary to its aims. However, by mid-June the delegates had been persuaded that invasion was a strategic necessity. Both Allen and Arnold had suggested that it would require just 2,000 men and, if reports of British weakness and the strength of pro-American feeling were true, the capture of Montreal and Quebec were assured. Arnold's plan involved a siege of St Johns by 700 troops, with another 1,000 bypassing the fort to seize Montreal (with the gates opened by sympathizers), and 300 more guarding the lines of communication along Lake Champlain and the Richelieu. With Montreal captured, St Johns, Chambly, and Quebec could not hold out and Congress would control the entire Province long before reinforcements could arrive, removing any threat of a British counterattack. The plan appealed to both Congress and to General Washington, and the invasion was approved on 27 June, but with the New Yorkers Schuyler and Montgomery, rather than the Yankee Arnold, in command. When Schuyler reached Ticonderoga on 18 July, he was confronted by utter chaos. Not only did the few troops present lack even the rudiments of discipline (and, moreover, have no intention of learning them from a haughty New Yorker), but the logistical systems so dear to his heart - and essential to wilderness warfare - were nonexistent. His experiences as deputy quartermaster general in the French and Indian War helped to remedy some defects, but it was the end of August before a very "rough and ready" Separate Army left Ticonderoga, and 2 September before it set foot on Canadian soil. When Carleton learned of the loss of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, he placed his lieutenant governor, Hector Cramahé, in charge at Quebec and left for Montreal with Major Joseph Stopford and most of the 7th Foot. At Montreal he found under 600 Regulars fit for duty, an indifferent and insubordinate militia, no armed vessels, no fort in good enough repair to withstand a siege, no immediate prospect of reinforcements, and a small but influential body of citizens openly consorting with the enemy. The seigneury soon rallied round, and the younger English colonists volunteered to serve at St Johns, but the habitants appeared "badly disposed." A proclamation by Bishop Briand of Quebec, urging them to ignore American propaganda and serve the King, elicited little response beyond the denunciation of the Bishop as a traitor. On 9 June, acting on advice from a leading seigneur, Carleton established martial law and called out the militia (though he was not optimistic about the response). Unfortunately, he made the mistake of choosing new senior officers from the nobility who had military experience but only in the regular French army. With no knowledge of the militia, they granted commissions to friends and relatives and ignored the existing officers. Not surprisingly, many were physically abused and chased out of the parishes. The English-speaking colonists were no more helpful: barely 70 men appeared when the "British Militia" of Quebec were called out. Carleton could understand the reluctance of the "New Subjects", but the behaviour of the "Old Subjects" left him incensed. Frustrated, he turned to a community he knew he could rely upon: the former Highland soldiers settled in Nova Scotia and the Mohawk Valley, who were being recruited by MacLean. Somewhat less welcome was the "reinforcement" from Boston - Brigadier-General Richard Prescott. Carleton gave him command of the Montreal garrison, but otherwise tried to ignore him. As if all of this was not enough, Carleton also had problems with the Indians, alarmed at American success and nervous of an invasion. Gage and others were insistent that they be used and so Carleton wrote to the posts at Detroit, Kaskaskia, and Michillimackinac, warning them of rebel activity and suggesting that they took steps to ensure the loyalty of local tribes. Guy Johnson, superintendent of the northern Indian Department, met Carleton at Lachine on 26 July, along with over 1,600 warriors who expressed a desire to lay waste New England. They were appalled when Carleton declined the offer and forbade them to cross the frontier, and Johnson, along with Joseph Brant and an Indian Department officer, Daniel Claus, went to England to seek permission for a more aggressive posture. An attempt by Carleton to placate the tribes by taking 50 warriors as scouts made no impact. Some, mainly Onondaga and St Regis, drifted home but others craved action. On 22 August, a group under the Chevalier Francois de Lorimier attacked some of Allen's men near the Lacolle River. Several Indians were wounded and one of Allen's officers - Remember Baker - was killed, at which Congress immediately sent a Stockbridge delegation to the Caughnawaga to explain that the clash had been accidental and that the Americans intended them no harm. Meanwhile, Carleton had turned his attention to the forts. He could not afford to yield territory, especially as Montreal only had a weak wall and ditch, therefore the defense had to be based near the frontier, so he ordered repairs to the defenses at St Johns and garrisoned it with as many Regulars and volunteers as he could find. He also sent to Halifax for carpenters and shipwrights and to Gage in Boston for the return of the 10th and 52nd Foot, so that he could chase the enemy back down Lake Champlain once they were defeated. However, when Liberty and Enterprise returned to St Johns and bombarded it on 7 June, Carleton knew that he faced an invasion by a buoyant enemy and that he had insufficient resources to repel it. Everything rested on St Johns: if it fell he would lose most of his Regulars and Montreal, leaving just Quebec standing between the Americans and control of Canada.